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The emergence of insight in problem solving
Michael W. Stadler
This paper relates the notion of insight in problem 
solving to the current debate concerning epistemo-
logical and ontological emergence. The psychologi-
cal school that stresses the relevance of insight for 
solving certain types of problems has been Gestalt 
theory. In classical Gestaltist writings, however, 
there is not much information about the question of 
whether or not insights are wholes with emergent 
properties. It is only in the more recent literature 
that this question is formulated. The present paper 
provides examples of insight problems (section I). 
Then it shows how insight was characterized in 
Gestalt theoretical writings, in particular by K. 
Duncker (II), and how this relates to the philosoph-
ical debate on emergence (III). After presenting 
two stances in research on problem solving that 
resemble the positions arguing for epistemological 
and ontological emergence (IV), I conclude with 
suggesting an alternative by complementing the 
basic part-whole framework with bidirectional pro-
cesses found in perceptual reversals of ambiguous 
figures (V). In so doing I suggest to understand 
insight as ‘intersight,’ which is not an emergent 
whole, but a hinge or switch that mediates 
between two or more part-whole structures (here: 
problem and solution).
INSIGHT PROBLEM SOLVING GESTALT THEORY DUNCKER EMERGENCE
P
hi
lo
so
ph
y 
K
it
ch
en
 #
11
 —
 A
nn
o
 7
 —
 S
et
te
m
br
e 
20
19
 —
 IS
S
N
: 2
38
5-
19
45
 —
 P
ar
ti
, i
ns
ie
m
i e
 s
is
te
m
i. 
Il
 c
on
ce
tt
o
 d
i e
m
er
g
en
za
 in
 fi
lo
so
fi
a
 164
T
he em
erg
ence of insight in
 problem
 solving
 —
 M
ichael W
. S
tadler
I. Introduction
Imagine that after a long and adventurous journey, in which you’ve died countless 
times, you finally reach the exit out of your nightmare. You’ve wandered through a 
selva oscura with spikes and spiders, you’ve found your way around cruel machines 
in factory buildings, and you’ve tricked the laws of magnetism in order to proceed 
and not to die again. Now you can clearly see the way out, it’s just a few more steps to 
safety. But as soon as you approach the exit, the pull of gravity switches and throws 
you upwards, right into a turning buzz saw. And there you painfully die once more, 
just to awake again where you stood seconds ago. What should you do now? Which 
idea comes to your mind? How many more failures will it take to find the solution? 
For one last puzzle, the award-winning video game Limbo is teasing out your wits. 
But after several attempts, you’ve figured it out and float into the light.
Change of scene. You’re a graduate student in need of quick money. You 
register for an experiment at the department of psychology. There, the team of sci-
entists ask you to sit down in a room and place a sheet of paper in front of you. On 
it, there are nine dots in a 3x3 pattern, with only one instruction: ‘Please connect the 
dots with no more than four straight lines and without lifting your pen’. Initially, you 
think it’s easy. You try it. You fail. You try and fail again and again. Is this possible at 
all? Are they actually testing your frustration tolerance and not your finding of the 
solution? Did they forget to give you more information? After a while, you suddenly 
realize that they gave you all the information you needed. The misleading factor was 
only part of your own mind.
And at last you’re a lieutenant, riding on a horse and being part of a cara-
van that is travelling in the desert. Next to you is another lieutenant on a horse, and 
in front of you an oasis comes into sight. The wealthy master of the caravan tells you 
and your colleague: «To that one of you whose horse reaches the oasis last, I will do-
nate this donkey laden with gold» (Wertheimer 2010, 55). Both of you ride towards 
the oasis, but you continuously slow down and finally wait in the shadow, reluctant 
to enter the oasis before the other does. You don’t know how to win this challenge. 
After a while, a wise man from the caravan comes to you and realizes the problem. He 
whispers something to both of you, two words only, and suddenly you both jump on 
the horses and race as fast as possible to enter the oasis. What did the wise man say? 
Which idea did he invoke in you? How could you fail to cognize the requirements for 
mastering the situation?
These are typical examples of how a person struggles with a problem and 
how, seemingly out of a sudden, he/she gains an insight that ideally leads to a pos-
sible solution. Although such Aha!-moments are familiar phenomenological experi-
ences in which the problem solver’s level of happiness and motivation rises due to 
an increased dopamine production in the brain (cf. Tik et al. 2018), the cognitive and 
philosophical explanation of how and why an insight comes into being is still unclear 
(cf. Davidson 1995, 125; Mayer 1995, 10). In this paper, I want to address the question 
of whether or not we should regard insight as an emergent phenomenon in the epis-
temological and/or ontological sense of emergence. In particular, I focus on the notion 
of insight as it was described in the classical Gestaltist literature on problem solving 
and productive thinking. This can be a starting point for further investigations into 
more recent conceptions of insight and their relation to emergentism. 
To do so, it is first of all important to explain what the notion of insight 
amounts to in Gestalt psychology, which I show using the example of K. Duncker (2). 
Then I turn to the current debate on epistemological and ontological emergence and 
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its implications for our understanding of reality as being ontologically ‘flat’ or ‘hier-
archical’ (3). In the third section, both approaches are combined in the question of 
whether the phenomenon of insight should be interpreted as being ontologically and/
or epistemologically emergent (4). Finally, I conclude by suggesting a Gestalt-inspired 
model that could avoid both options. This model involves a rethinking of insight as an 
interface between problem and problem solver, i.e. by understanding insight as ‘in-
tersight’ (5).
II. The phenomenon of Insight in Gestaltist Problem Solving
The second example above-mentioned describes the famous nine-dot problem, which 
is a typical insight problem. Unlike transformation problems like the Rubik’s Cube 
that can be solved by following a sequence of steps towards a goal state of which we 
have a clear image from the beginning, here we have to literally think ‘outside the box’ 
and extend the straight lines we draw beyond the position of the dots. Thus the cor-
rect solution of an insight problem is «initially not visible or imaginable» (Weller 2011, 
424). Only due to a seemingly spontaneous insight we can connect the dots accord-
ing to the given instructions, which is all but obvious in the beginning.  In other words, 
[…] difficulty arises because people make an incorrect assumption (adopt an inappropriate inter-
pretation) – namely, that lines should begin and end on dots (i.e., that lines should be confined 
to the area defined by the dots). The problem cannot be solved with this constraint. Solving this 
type of problem may require doing something novel […]. (Dominowski et al. 1995, 43)
There are different kinds of insight problems. Apart from spatial insight problems, 
to which also the nine-dot problem belongs, there are object-use problems, which 
«typically involve multiple objects and require one object be used in a relatively nov-
el manner to achieve the goal (which might be arbitrary itself)» (Dominowski et al. 
1995, 43). An example would be the above-mentioned puzzle in Limbo, where the 
player has to use the shifting forces of gravity and in so doing activate an arrow board 
while falling down to finish the game. Furthermore, there are verbal insight problems, 
i.e. problem situations that more or less depend on the way they are presented and 
the concepts we (fail to) activate to solve them (Dominowski et al. 1995, 43f.). The 
third example from the introduction is of this type: the master explicitly stresses that 
the horses should reach the oasis last, not the riders. So what is the two-word sug-
gestion of the wise man? ‘Change horses!’ of course. To these types we can add every-
day insight problems, i.e. problems that are not created for a specific setting like a lab-
oratory experiment or a game, but encountered in real life (cf. Ericsson et al. 1994), 
such as finding ideas for a project, inventing something, or the moment we come 
to understand why a person acts in a specific way. Regardless of the type, however, 
there are major experiential characteristics that make it possible to identify insight as 
an emergent phenomenon. Among others, it involves
(1) suddenness, wherein insight seems to happen abruptly through a quantum leap of un-
derstanding instead of some gradual incremental process; (2) spontaneity, wherein insight 
seems to happen internally of its own accord without the intention or effort of an instigating 
agent; (3) unexpectedness, wherein insight happens by surprise and without warning; and 
(4) satisfaction, whereby insight elegantly fulfills a previously unresolved need, culminating 
in a triumphant ‘Aha!’ experience. (Seifert et al. 1995, 67)
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Characteristics like these legitimate the question if and how insight is classifiable as 
being epistemologically or even ontologically emergent. Prior to this, however, it is 
worthwhile to take a closer look at the psychological school that heavily influenced 
later discussions of this notion in cognitive psychology, problem solving and beyond: 
the pre-war Berlin school of Gestalt theory (cf. on its history Ash 1995). Gestalt the-
oretical research back then was and still is primarily focused on human perception, in 
particular on the relations between parts and wholes (based on principles/laws that 
make a whole – the Gestalt – determine the function and appearance of its parts) 
as well as figure and ground. Whereas in the conclusion I suggest to rethink the phe-
nomenon of insight as ‘intersight’ inspired by figure-ground research, it is mainly the 
first relation that has been transferred by Gestalt theory from the field of perception 
to the field of problem solving. As Bassok (2012, 416) puts it,
The Gestalt psychologists extended the organizational principles of visual perception to the 
domain of problem solving. They showed that various visual aspects of the problem, as well 
the solver’s prior knowledge, affect how people understand problems and, therefore, gener-
ate problem solutions. The principles of visual perception (e.g., proximity, closure, grouping, 
good continuation) are directly relevant to problem solving when the physical layout of the 
problem, or a diagram that accompanies the problem description, elicits inferences that solv-
ers include in their problem representations.
Thus one of Gestalt theory’s central axioms for problem solving is that our mental 
representation of a problem is similar to a (Gestalt-)percept from an empirical or-
igin. Both are governed by the same principles or laws. The visualization of a prob-
lem and the cognitive acts with which we operate on this visual representation can 
lead to insights concerning the solution for a problem. This axiom is clarified, for ex-
ample, in K. Duncker’s seminal work on problem solving. Like many researchers after 
him, Duncker defines a problem as a path or trajectory that begins with a given situ-
ation and ends with a desired situation (the goal). The transition from what is given 
to what is desired takes place via one or more actions. 
For, to solve a problem involves making what is given serviceable to what is demanded. 
That I must know what is given, in order to operate with it, and must also know what is 
demanded, in order to operate toward it, this in turn follows analytically from the nature 
of action. For action means acting, guided by knowledge of the purpose and of the means. 
(Duncker 1945, 60) 
However, if we don’t know which actions we should take to reach the goal (because 
the goal can be unknown, or the given situation unclear, or the path is blocked), then 
we have to resort to «recourse to thinking» (Duncker 1945, 1). The type of thinking 
Duncker and with him other members of the Gestalt school advocate does not or not 
primarily associate earlier problem situations with the given situation. Instead, think-
ing through a given problem situation should ideally and in many cases grasp the de-
mands and requirements of the situation at hand so that our mind produces (via an 
original insight) instead of reproducing (via prior knowledge) a possible solution (cf. 
Duncker 1926, 656f.; 697). In other words, if we want to come up with a creative 
solution to a specific problem and not just repeat earlier actions and ideas related to 
similar problems in the hope that they will suffice, then first we have to fully under-
stand the singularity of the given situation:
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[…] in seeking a solution, one must bring the given problem-situation as clearly as possible into 
focus. He who merely searches his memory for a ‘solution of that such-and-such problem’ 
may remain just as blind to the inner nature of the problem-situation before him as a person 
who, instead of thinking himself, refers the problem to an intelligent acquaintance or to an 
encyclopedia. (Duncker 1945, 20)
Being confronted with a problem situation is like perceiving a Gestalt, i.e. a holistic 
structure composed of several parts, whose function and appearance depend on the 
whole and the laws it wields over its parts. Although or perhaps because the instan-
tiations of these laws are individual for each problem, it is only in seeing their gen-
erality that an insight into the nature and solvability of the problem in question can 
be gained. Gaining an insight is thus to see the problem situation and its context as 
a whole, and then to ‘penetrate’ (cf. Duncker 1926, 668) the whole so that its parts - 
their functions, interrelations and in particular their conflicts - become visible for our 
thinking mind, i.e. accessible for our visualizing mind. «To each solution corresponds 
a ground of conflict present in the situation. Analysis of the situation is therefore 
analysis of conflict». (Duncker 1945, 21) In addition to conflicting parts («“What is 
wrong here? What must I change?”», Duncker 1945, 21), an analysis of the situation 
also reveals ‘material’ parts («’What must I use?’», Duncker 1945, 21) that might be 
adjuvant for solving the problem. Insight means to become aware of these parts by 
firstly grasping the problem as a whole and then by analyzing the singular parts as 
displaying a general structure of conflicting and heuristic relations. Insight is thus ex-
actly not the learning of arbitrary connections between elements via repetition, tri-
al-and-error methods and the reproduction of associations, but «to single out from a 
particular case the general relationship» (Duncker 1926, 661). 
Once we develop the internal representation of the given situation in terms 
of grasping its general structure that consists of conflicting and material elements, 
we are able to rearrange or ‘restructure’ these elements in such a way that a number 
of actions are feasible to reach the desired situation. We thus change the function of 
those parts that are preventing the achievement of the goal. We also grasp the actu-
al usefulness of a given part, for example by detaching it from another part to which 
it has been ‘functionally fixed’ (e.g. by separating horse from rider in the third exam-
ple). The thorough analysis of the situation makes already evident which parts have 
to be restructured. This means that the process of restructuration is already happen-
ing and going along with the state of insight. «Insight is in fact a seeing, a becoming 
evident of something […]. Evidence, then, is the objective aspect of what in a more 
subjective sense is called insight» (Duncker 1945, 52). The ideal penetration of the 
problem situation is thus more than just a grasping of what is there: it is at the same 
time a grasping of how the situation can be changed for the solution to be reached. 
The problem includes its solution from the outset. It is the task of our thinking mind 
to become aware of the evident solution by seeing what is not yet directly present via 
a variation of the given parts or aspects. «What is read off must represent an aspect 
which is new in contrast to the original phenomenal aspect – not of course new in 
the sense of added material such as may be discovered by more exact observation» 
(Duncker 1945, 56). In the context of visual perception, this process of reading off 
unseen aspects from a percept is called ‘amodal completion,’ (cf. Metzger 2006, 135). 
It is exactly by means of visualizing and thus understanding how (some 
of) the given parts have to be restructured that the path to the goal can be cleared: 
«a solution always consists in a variation of some crucial element of the situation» 
(Duncker 1945, 20). Some parts might at first glance be hidden or play a minor role, 
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but need to be found and highlighted. Also, the functions of parts can be changed: 
first we perceive gravity as an obstacle in the Limbo example, but on closer inspec-
tion we realize that it is the driving force that pushes us out of the level. Furthermore, 
«[p]arts of the situation which were formerly separated as parts of different wholes, 
or had no specific relation although they are parts of the same whole, may be united 
in one new whole» (Duncker 1945, 29). In any case, «the moments of sudden com-
prehension, of the ‘Aha!,’ of the new, are always at the same time moments in which 
such a sudden restructuring of the thought-material takes place, in which something 
‘tips over’» (Duncker 1945, 20). What is important for such a restructuring to take 
place and thus for having an insight is firstly to not only concentrate on the given sit-
uation, but also to envision the new, desired structure in the given one. In other words, 
«[t]he most radical shifts of function within a system are often carried out without 
any difficulty, if one already knows what proposition is to be employed and therefore 
what sort of structure is to be sought in the given material» (Duncker 1945, 109) 
And secondly, as every part can contribute to the finding of a creative solution, «the 
subject must be so much better off, the more and the more varied aspects he/she is 
able to command at one glance, i.e. without tedious “work of explication”» (Duncker 
1945, 39).
Other Gestalt theorists generally share Duncker’s conception of insight as 
a mental state or process. It involves a representation of a particular problem situa-
tion in terms of ‘seeing into’ or ‘penetrating’ it in order to ‘read off’ its general traits 
and at the same time to grasp the variability of the parts in order to restructure 
(some of) them. What is also shared are Duncker’s rather critical yet not categori-
cally denying stance towards associationist theories of past experience and his ap-
plication of perceptual Gestalt laws of part-grouping to the domain of problem rep-
resentation. M. Wertheimer (1959, 235), for example, claims that thinking through a 
problem «consists in envisaging, realizing structural features and structural require-
ments; proceeding in accordance with, and determined by, these requirements, there-
by changing the situation in the direction of structural improvements […]». The way 
we change and improve the situation is exactly by modifying, i.e. separating, combin-
ing, relocating, or highlighting and ignoring some parts (cf. Wertheimer 1967, 180). 
An insight doesn’t often happen in an immediate flash, but «the flash may occur after 
a lot of brooding and perplexity» (Luchins 1970, 340). To a certain degree, this also 
holds true for higher forms of animal intelligence, as W. Köhler (1973) found out in 
his famous experiments with chimpanzees. A good summary of the early Gestaltist 
understanding of insight is given by Wertheimer (2010, 50):
Crucial in productive thinking is grasping the core or essence of the problem, understanding 
its key features, developing insight into its genuine nature, and not being distracted by irrele-
vant or superficial characteristics. When such reorganization occurs, when the solution “clicks” 
for the thinker, when the nature of the problem has been fully grasped, there typically is a 
satisfying “Aha!” experience; a previously murky, confused conception of the problem situa-
tion is transformed into a clear, simple, often elegant recognition of the true organization of 
the problem’s structure and its solution.
More formally, we can define insight in this classical context, i.e. in  disregard of lat-
er studies on this subject, as follows: Insight is an experiential state or process that 
occurs when we mentally represent and understand a problem as a whole w1 (the 
given situation) with a variable and partly conflicting constellation of parts p1, such 
that due to an adequate representation and understanding of w1 and p1 a novel 
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whole w2 (the desired situation) and the restructuration of p1 into p2 that is requi-
red to reach w2 become evident and feasible. Such a definition, of course, is not only 
inchoate like every other definition, but also provokes many questions. One of them 
sounds as follows: is an insight, similar to what could be claimed about consciousness 
and freedom, something that comes into being as a novel entity which, once emerged, 
is autonomous from the given problem situation w1 with p1 and able to ‘downward-
ly’ cause w1 and p1 to turn into w2 and p2? Or is it nothing more than an epiphe-
nomenon that is necessitated by w1 and p1 in order to reach w2 with p2 but without 
‘life of its own,’ like a tool that is only there to replace w1/p1 with w2/p2 in full ac-
cordance with the underlying laws of the situation? In other words: Should we classi-
fy the state of insight as being ontologically (strongly) or rather as epistemologically 
(weakly) emergent, and: tertium non datur? 
III. On Epistemological and Ontological Emergence
In spite of this notion’s long history, many philosophical and related disciplines have 
recently been experiencing a «re-emergence of emergence theories in contemporary 
thought» (Clayton 2006: 27). Different domains of reality, such as the ones studied 
by philosophy, physics, chemistry, biology, neurosciences, psychology and sociology 
(cf. Paoletti et al. 2017, 9), have been investigated under the aspect of whether and 
why they involve entities, properties, processes, states or any other signs of emer-
gence, including questions about the nature and possibility of emergence itself. We 
can simply say that something is emergent when a number of interrelated physical 
or physiological parts compose a whole whose properties are not explainable just by 
the parts and their properties (cf. Hendry et al. 2019, 1). These emergent properties or 
states could be mental, like concepts, consciousness or the Aha!-state of gaining in-
sight (cf. Robb 2019). Since the whole in question is not sufficiently explainable with 
regard to its parts, it’s impossible to reduce the former to the latter. «Emergence is 
the opposite of reduction. Properties and behavior are emergent at higher levels with 
respect to the lower if they cannot be reduced to the properties and laws manifested 
by the lower-level objects» (Robinson 2009, 527). 
In addition to irreducibility and the kind of autonomy this involves, emer-
gent wholes or wholes with emergent properties are usually characterized by being 
the result of self-organizing processes among the parts (cf. Boi 2017, 182); by being 
able to causally or otherwise act ‘down’ on their parts; by showing some kind of nov-
elty in relation to their parts; by being however initially dependent on their parts’ ex-
istence because they are ‘upwardly’ causing the whole; and by coming into being in an 
unpredictable, often unexpected way (cf. Wong 2019, 179). Thereby the phrase ‘com-
ing into being’ already provokes one of the main problems we face when we think 
about emergent phenomena: what is their actual ontological status, i.e. do they really 
come into existence as an addition to the ontological inventory of what is there, or are 
we just acting as if they had their own ontological status to facilitate the description 
of such phenomena? To apply this question to the phenomenon of Gestaltist insight 
in problem solving, it is necessary to see what both stances comprise in a nutshell.
Epistemological or epistemic emergence, often used synonymously with 
‘weak emergence,’ is a stance that even radical reductionists for whom there is noth-
ing but physical particles and their relations could agree with. This is because epis-
temological emergence does not make claims about the nature of reality as such. 
Therefore it doesn’t claim that while wholes might indeed be causally dependent 
on their parts, they would also be ontologically independent of them. Instead, here 
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«emergence is merely an artefact of a particular model or formalism generated by 
macroscopic analysis, functional description or some other kind of ‘higher-level’ de-
scription or explanation» (Silberstein et al. 1999, 182). If we accept the framework 
of epistemological emergence, it would be fine, for example, to say ‘this is all society’s 
fault’ or to ask ‘why did you do that to this person’? Whereas the whole ‘society’ can 
be nothing but the sum of its individual members with their individual faults, which 
are in turn nothing but the sum of their bodies’ and brains’ cells and particles, it’s still 
heuristically useful to say ‘society’ in order to describe these sums and to do as if a 
personification of them could make sense. The second question seems to imply the 
existence of free will, but in fact it may be just a rhetorical phrase that describes and 
judges bodily actions determined by chemical reactions in the brain. In many cases, 
it’s hard or impossible to determine exactly which parts are responsible for the be-
havior of the whole, although it’s undeniable that they are responsible to such an ex-
tent that no further attribution has to be made to the whole beyond the parts. Thus at 
least hypothetically, the whole as explanandum is fully understandable and explaina-
ble by the parts as explanans. As Silberstein et al. (1999, 186) have it, 
A property of an object or system is epistemologically emergent if the property is reducible 
to or determined by the intrinsic properties of the ultimate constituents of the object or sys-
tem, while at the same time it is very difficult for us to explain, predict or derive the proper-
ty on the basis of the ultimate constituents. Epistemologically emergent properties are novel 
only at a level of description.
While epistemological emergence has advantages like being «metaphysically inno-
cent, consistent with materialism, and scientifically useful […]» (Bedau 1997, 376), 
its counterpart, ontological emergence, «has the merit of preserving commonsense 
intuitions and corresponding to our everyday experience as agents in the world» 
(Clayton 2006, 27). If we claim that there are wholes whose properties are ontolog-
ically emergent, then we state that these properties indeed have been coming into 
being as an ontologically independent yet causally dependent effect of the parts and 
their respective compositions. Then such properties aren’t just epiphenomenal fea-
tures or resultant properties, i.e. qualities of the whole that are in fact non-attrib-
utable to the parts, but that nonetheless disappear as soon as the parts disappear. 
For example, a tomato’s spherical shape and its power to roll might not be found in 
any of its parts. «Yet it does not seem that the tomato’s shape is, in any interesting 
sense, an ontologically emergent property. The shape is just what you get when you 
put the tomato’s parts together in a particular way». (Heil 2017, 45) We only speak 
of something being ontologically emergent when it has the capacity to causally act 
back or ‘downwards’ on its parts. This necessitates a kind of ontological independ-
ence from the parts and also presupposes a hierarchy of what is lower (the parts) 
and what ranks higher (the whole). In the epistemological emergentist framework, 
on the other hand, it’s sufficient to postulate a ‘flat ontology’ where parts exist on 
the same level – just because there is nothing that is irreducible to them. While this 
goes strongly against a commonsense conception of reality and causes explanato-
ry problems, for example concerning the existence of mental phenomena and the 
question of how far parts can be subdivided until they are finally atomic, also the 
vertical ontology of ontological emergence is not without difficulties. One of them 
concerns the infinite proliferation of entities taking place when not only parts and 
parts on the same level, but also wholes and parts, create novel wholes ad infinitum 
(cf. Husserl 2001, 37). Another difficulty is to conceptualize the hierarchy as a static, 
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layered pyramid, which would imply a tight parallelization of levels. As Emmech et 
al. (1997, 93) point out: 
One should avoid a parallelistic interpretation saying that one level is created out of another, 
and that it exists in parallel to the first level, as two separate levels without any further inter-
action. To exaggerate a little: if the parallel existence was true, as a human being you would 
not be one but several different entities on several different levels. Your physical body, your 
biological body and your psyche etc. - and it would seem rather miraculous that it always 
happened to be focused at the same point in space.
On the one hand, it’s impossible to go into more details here on these interesting 
matters or to even develop a solid position. On the other hand, it’s important to keep 
in mind this general background when returning now to the more special field of 
Gestaltist insight in problem solving. Do we find positions and arguments there that 
reflect the just delineated philosophical discussion on epistemological and ontological 
emergence? And is it thinkable to circumnavigate the respective dangers of a flat and 
a hierarchical conception of reality, the Charybdis and Scylla of emergentism?
IV. What Kind of Emergent Phenomena Are Insights?
The early Gestalt psychologists stood, among others for institutional reasons con-
cerning faculty positions and funding, very close to philosophical ideas from dis-
ciplines such as phenomenology, ontology and natural philosophy (cf. Ash 1995). 
Nevertheless, to my knowledge the philosophical question concerning the ontological 
status and genesis of insight was not reflected upon. Although also in recent research 
the connection with the philosophical discussion about weaker and stronger forms 
of emergence has not been made explicit, we can broadly distinguish two views that 
seem to reflect this discussion. Both views deal with the fact that insights, like emer-
gent phenomena in general, display certain characteristics like novelty and unpredict-
ability that could make them qualify as additional entries to our ontological invento-
ry. Insights appear to be ontologically independent, higher mental states or processes 
with which we causally influence the problem situation they result from by repre-
senting, restructuring and improving or solving (parts of) this situation. But insights 
could also be just epiphenomena reducible to already existing bits of prior knowledge. 
The view that resembles the stance of epistemological emergence and its principle 
of reducibility has been called the ‘business-as-usual perspective,’ the ‘nothing-new 
view,’ or the ‘nothing-special view.’ It «proposes that insight is merely an extension 
of ordinary processes of perceiving, recognizing, learning, and conceiving» (Davidson 
1995, 127). This «nothing-new view of insight [is] the idea that insight is nothing but 
following a chain of preestablished associations» (Mayer 1995, 7). In other words, 
From the perspective of business as usual, insight per se is viewed as either relatively unim-
portant or even nonexistent as distinct cognitive phenomenon associated with reasoning, 
planning, problem solving, and so forth. Adherents to the business-as-usual perspective disa-
vow using the term insight […]. To the extent that they acknowledge insight’s existence at all, 
they attribute it to normal mental processes such as memory search, hypothesis testing, and 
trial-and-error solution attempts based on past experience.  (Seifert 1995, 68)
The alternative to this view is more in line with the traditional Gestaltist conception 
of insight as well as with ontological emergence in the philosophical context. This 
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view has been called the ‘special-process view’ (Davidson 1995, 126), the ‘prepared 
mind perspective’ (Seifert 1995, 74), or most often just something similar to the ‘view 
of the Gestalt tradition.’ It holds that insights are irreducible to other phenomena, be 
it the stimuli of the problem situation and its perception, or associations with prior 
experiences, or functions of the nervous system. Instead, it assumes «that insight is 
a researchable cognitive phenomenon [that] may emerge from a combination of in-
formation-processing phases whose joint interactions enable subconscious quantum 
leaps during the generation of new mental products» (Seifert 1995, 75). Classifying 
insight in this rather strongly emergent way has the benefit of accounting, for at least 
the experience of exactly this kind of incubation phase that occurs regularly during 
the development of insights (cf. Wallas 1926). After realizing what a particular prob-
lem is about and preparing our mind to solve it, we let it sink into unconsciousness 
until «there is an abrupt shift to the illumination phase, wherein a penetrating flash 
of insight about an appropriate satisfying resolution to the original problematic situ-
ation occurs unexpectedly» (Seifert 1995, 75). Whereas with a pre-established set of 
atomic memory bits we could theoretically figure out the correct solution to a prob-
lem just by recalling, recombining and then applying what we already know, it is this 
unpredictability which is typical of insights that prevents us from entering the illu-
mination phase deliberately. Unlike in the case of recalling something from memory, 
even our gut feeling of approaching a correct solution for an insight problem is most-
ly misleading (cf. Metcalfe 1986). But adopting the special process view does not only 
allow us to demarcate what the Gestaltists called ‘reproductive’ (associative) and 
‘productive’ (insightful) thinking. The analogy according to which insights are men-
tal Gestalts also allows us to apply research on perceptual Gestalts as emergent phe-
nomena to the mental domain of insights, thereby concluding a similar classification 
for the latter by analogy. A case in point would be Stadler et al.’s (1994) hypothesis 
on Gestalt theory being a precursor of synergetics, i.e. the study of self-organization 
in open systems:
In Gestalt theory, the origin of coherent order out of the synergy of interacting elementary 
units was the explicit starting point for research. Gestalt qualities are defined as emerging 
phenomenologically from those interactions but not as reducible to them. […] In Gestalt the-
ory the order of the perceptual field emerges out of the perceptual elements and the Gestalts 
are the organizing force of the elements. (Stadler et al. 1994, 213)
Understanding insight as strongly emergent also enables similar analogies such as the 
one between problem solving and biological evolution. Perkins, for example, argues 
convincingly for a common classification of insights and evolutionary steps as ‘gen-
eral breakthrough events,’ which are «episodes of sudden innovation that might ap-
pear in any creative system […]» (Perkins 1995: 496). But this is exactly the problem 
of regarding insight as being ontologically emergent. There are still too many hypoth-
eses, vagueness and research desiderata. Since too much has to be explained by draw-
ing on analogies, metaphors and irreproducible experiences reported in anecdotes, 
the concept of insight is scientifically difficult to research. As a phenomenological 
experience, an insight may intuitively feel as if it is strongly emergent, which is why 
there are many anecdotes on this notion, often involving inventors, scientists and 
artists. But there are not only a number of empirical experiments with quite critical 
results concerning the Gestaltist depreciation (not: rejection) of past experience for 
insight problems (cf. Mayer 1995, 7). The fact that certain variables have to remain 
underdefined for something that is supposed to ‘come into being’ spontaneously and 
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creatively prevents any form of concrete empirical testing as well as any non-mys-
terious definition of insight as a novel mental state (cf. Davidson 1995, 127). Finally, 
a certain reading of the classical Gestaltist literature on problem solving might even 
relativize the general understanding of insight as something that suddenly emerges 
out of nothing. Why should insight be understood as a novel state through which we 
can causally influence a problem, if the problem already contains its own solution? As 
is Duncker states if, «what is really done in any solution of problems consists in for-
mulating the problem more productively» (Duncker 1945, 9), because «a solution 
always consists in a variation of some crucial element of the situation» (Duncker 
1945, 20). If our actions and the range of adequate ideas are thus determined by what 
is already contained in and required by the problem situation, then what is the gen-
uinely novel property of an insight? How does the mental state of having an insight 
contribute to causally change the problem, if the problem is its pre-formed solution 
from the outset, i.e. if our mental representation of the problem is only a heuristic re-
production of the already existing solution?
V. Conclusion: Rethinking Insight As ‘Intersight’
What we have learned so far is that the phenomenon of insight in theories on prob-
lem solving provokes questions and stances similar to the ones concerning entities 
with epistemological and ontological properties in recent philosophical debates. For 
future research it’s worthwhile to relate these to fields closer to each other, so that 
arguments from one field can be applied to the other and vice versa. The empiri-
cal and phenomenological evidence of problem solving can thereby serve to veri-
fy or falsify some of the rather speculative and ontological statements in debates 
on emergentism. In addition, alternative conceptualizations of how we solve insight 
problems might enrich fundamental assumptions of theories on emergence. One of 
these assumptions consists in the already mentioned mereological approach that en-
tails either a ‘flattening-out’ or a ‘hierarchization’ of reality. In both cases we think in 
mereological structures, either by making wholes ontologically reducible to and thus 
basically identical with their parts, or by making them rank higher in a hierarchy with 
an upwards direction of emergence and optionally a downwards direction of causa-
tion. But both cases are problematic for different reasons and therefore it would be 
welcome to find alternative approaches. 
How Gestaltist research on insight can contribute to the debate on emer-
gence is, among others, such an alternative. It draws on the fact that the mental 
representation and restructuring of insight problems is derived from the empirical 
perception of Gestalt-wholes and the principles of their internal organization. As we 
have seen, however, transferring only the perceptual part-whole patterns to prob-
lem solving results in issues similar to the mereological framework in emergence. But 
apart from part-whole structures, there is another important perceptual phenom-
enon studied by Gestalt theory: the one of multistability in ambiguous figures. The 
most famous are perhaps the duck-rabbit picture or reversible figure-ground pat-
terns like Rubin’s famous vase-faces drawing. In such figures, there are two or more 
layers of meaning that neither exclude nor include each other. If we imagine a re-
versible figure with two possible sides A and B, then either A is foregrounded and B 
is backgrounded or vice versa. What is interesting about this dynamic interaction be-
tween the two sides and what has already been noticed by Rubin himself is that A 
and B do not constitute an either/or relationship, but are respectively present even 
when backgrounded. Thus if A is foregrounded, there are still present traces of B in A, 
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because we precipitate and anticipate B even when A is directly given, and vice ver-
sa (cf. Rubin 1921, 33). Also, what is foregrounded has a higher degree of form, real-
ity and perceptual meaning (Rubin 1921, 35, 45, 74). From this it can follow that the 
form, reality and meaning of what is now backgrounded is still amodally present in 
what is now foregrounded. The ongoing process of switching back and forth ontolog-
ically enriches the percept with and due to its two or more sides. Due to the mutual 
influencing and changing, there is no higher or lower in this relation of sides, but also 
no reducibility of one side to the other, because only in their being different, the phe-
nomenon can keep its quality of being multistable and ambiguous. 
To conclude admittedly vaguely, I think we could reconceptualize the phe-
nomenon of insight by taking into consideration this bidirectional, perceptual pro-
cess of backgrounding and foregrounding. Insight is not an emerging state or process 
that acts ‘down’ on the parts of the problem, but a hinge or switch that mediates be-
tween what is initially foregrounded (the given problem or initial state, w1) and what 
should be foregrounded (the solution or goal state, w2). With insight, thus under-
stood as a function or a torsional moment, we do not only ‘see into’ a problem, but we 
also ‘see into’ the solution. Insight is thus a janiform perspective without ontological 
existence of its own. Instead, it enables the ontological status of the problem as prob-
lem and of the solution as being realizable through action, and thus it functions as an 
interface between the two. Insight as interface between interacting and mutually en-
riching sides is therefore rather an ‘intersight’ that carries form, reality and meaning 
from the problem to the solution and back in order to gradually concretize the initial-
ly only anticipated solution. Since from the beginning and according to the Gestaltist 
view, w2 is in a way latent (i.e. neither fully present nor fully absent) in w1, the act 
of intersight needs to take recourse to the parts p1 of w1 and turn them into p2: not 
for w2 to come into existence, because it already exists in w1, but to gradually give 
form, reality and meaning to the initially formless, latent and meaningless existence 
of w2. This is thus a weak form of ontological emergence that modifies what already 
exists (w1/p1) into an alternative version (w2/p2), which has always been there as 
a possibility inherent to w1/p1. One factor that might bring or keep the interchange 
of perspectives called intersight in motion are one or more bits of prior knowledge, 
one or more associations with earlier problem situations. But since with every turn of 
switching what is foregrounded appears in a new light due to the constant, mutual 
enrichment of problem and solution, we are always facing unique modifications and 
aspects of a problem, depending on what the solution demands.
This preliminary model of intersight, inspired by Gestalt research on am-
biguous figures and multistability, could not only motivate future research on prob-
lem solving based on scattered comments in the literature, where restructurations 
are described as sudden figure-ground-reversals (cf. e.g. Bergius 1964). Future re-
search could also investigate how to develop dynamic, non-hierarchical yet non-flat 
frameworks to re-conceptualize emergent phenomena. I think that the ‘causal-trans-
formative’ model of emergence and ‘demergence’ recently developed by Anjum & 
Mumford’s (2017) could be a good starting point. For the moment an elaboration of 
the just given suggestion has to remain the anticipation of a yet backgrounded paper.
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